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The quantum measurement problem can be regarded as the tension between the two alternative
dynamics prescribed by quantum mechanics: the unitary evolution of the wave function and the
state-update rule (or “collapse”) at the instant a measurement takes place. The notorious Wigner’s
friend gedankenexperiment constitutes the paradoxical scenario in which different observers (one of
whom is observed by the other) describe one and the same interaction differently, one –the Friend–
via state-update and the other –Wigner– unitarily. This can lead Wigner and his Friend assigning
different conditional probabilities to the outcome of the same measurement, given their respective
observed results of a previous measurement. Different probability assignments may lead to an actual
contradiction in the formalism, if the different predictions can be in principle compared in an exper-
iment. In this paper, we apply the Page-Wootters mechanism (PWM) to give an a priori timeless
description of Wigner’s friend-like scenarios, which allows Wigner and his Friend to unambiguously
assign two-time conditional probabilities for the gedankenexperiment. We propose three rules to
assign two-time conditional probabilities, all of which reduce to standard quantum theory for non-
Wigner’s friend scenarios. However, when applied to the Wigner’s friend setup each rule assigns
different conditional probabilities, potentially resolving the probability-assignment paradox in a dif-
ferent manner. Moreover, one rule imposes strict conditions on when a joint probability distribution
for the measurement outcomes of Wigner and his Friend is well-defined, which single out those
cases where their predictions can be compared and such probabilities have an operational meaning
in terms of collectible statistics. Interestingly, the same limits guarantee that said measurement
outcomes fulfill the consistency condition of the consistent histories framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
Standard quantum theory features two dynamical pro-
cesses: the so-called collapse postulate or measurement-
update rule and the unitary evolution describing the
propagation of the wave function in the absence of mea-
surements.1 However, quantum theory itself does not
specify when each process should apply, leading to the
well-known quantum measurement problem [1, 2].2
∗ These three authors contributed equally.
1 Without further ontological commitment regarding a “collapse
of the wave function”, hereinafter we use the term collapse for
the application of the state-update rule, meaning it is the up-
dated state that is used to calculate probabilities for subsequent
measurements.
2 In the vast literature devoted to this topic, the “quantum mea-
surement problem” does not have a unique, clear definition. In-
tuitively, it can be thought of as the problem of how, when and
under what circumstances definite values of physical variables are
obtained [3]. Obtaining definite values is commonly equated with
the application of the state-update rule. In this paper, however,
we focus on the ambiguity of probability assignments conditional
on a process that can be considered either as a unitary evolution
or measurement.
This situation is illustrated by the gedankenexperi-
ment of Wigner’s friend [4]. An observer F (the Friend)
performs a measurement on a quantum system S in
a closed laboratory, the outcome of which is recorded
by the click of a measuring apparatus and/or as a
definite record in the Friend’s memory inside the lab-
oratory. After the measurement, F assigns a state to
S conditioned on her measurement outcome (i.e., state
update). Simultaneously, another observer W (Wigner)
situated outside of the laboratory, would describe the
entire measurement by F as unitary, resulting in him
assigning a specific entangled state to F and S. This
to the paradoxical situation that the two observers F
and W assign different states after F ’s measurement
and, hence, different probabilities to the outcomes of
subsequent measurements. As shown in Refs. [5–7], the
seemingly natural assumptions that quantum theory
is universal, that different observers can each apply
either of the two dynamical processes of the theory with
respect to their description, and that the reasoning of
different agents about one another can be combined
lead to contradictions for Wigner’s friend setups. These
contradictions can be regarded as resulting from an
observer dependent application of the state-update rule
and from combining inferences about the outcomes
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2different observers obtain at different times.
However, to arrive at an actual contradiction or in-
consistency in a description of the Wigner’s friend sit-
uation, it is not enough that different observers assign
different quantum states to the set-up (In fact, this is
what is expected in relational quantum mechanics [8]).
Rather, one would need to show that situations exist in
which these different predictions can actually be com-
pared in an experimental test. Accordingly, in this paper,
we start from the requirement that in every experimen-
tally testable situation in which Wigner and the friend
can compare their probabilistic predictions, the proba-
bilities must agree. We then show that this requirement
limits possible rules for conditional probabilities. To this
end, we apply the Page-Wootters mechanism (PWM) [9]
as an a priori timeless description of Wigner’s friend-like
scenarios, which allows Wigner and his Friend to assign
the same conditional probabilities.
In the PWM time evolution emerges from quantum
correlations between a clock and a system whose dynam-
ics the clock will track. The advantage of the timeless
approach in the context of the Wigner’s friend gedanken-
experiment is that it assigns one specific timeless state
for a given setup from which all observers can compute
probabilities of an event conditioned on another, regard-
less of their temporal order as indicated by the clock.
Hence, the Page-Wootters mechanism (PWM) allows us
to address the following two questions:
1. What is the probability that W measures outcome
w at clock time t2, given that F has measured out-
come f at a previous clock time t1?
2. What is the probability that F measures outcome
f at clock time t1, conditioned on the fact that W
will measure outcome w at a later clock time t2?
We choose t1 < t2 for convenience but since we consider
both conditioning on the past and the future this does
not reduce the generality of our considerations. Standard
quantum theory, with the collapse postulate, cannot ad-
dress the second question at all, although there exists
another formulation of the theory of quantum measure-
ment that considers only probabilities and that is time-
symmetric [10, 11]. Yet, the timeless nature of PWM
provides a general framework to condition on both past
and future events.
We will show that given the timeless state there ex-
ist more than one way to consistently assign conditional
probabilities for the PWM, all of which reduce to stan-
dard quantum conditional probabilities for non-Wigners
friend scenarios. Using the PWM all observers will agree
on the overall state (i.e., a physical state satisfying a
Hamiltonian constraint), which they use to make prob-
abilistic predictions. Assuming they all use the same
probability rule they will agree in their probability as-
signments for all measurements they can carry out. De-
pending on the choice of rule, however, Wigner and his
Friend can assign different, yet among them consistent,
conditional probabilities for their results, thus resolving
the paradox of the ambiguous probability assignments
in different manners. The first rule gives probabilities
that correspond to applying the state-update rule after
the Friend’s measurement and, hence, suggests collapse
dynamics for all observers. The other two rules are in
accordance with unitary evolution and give conditional
probabilities different from the first rule. Moreover, they
give well-defined probabilities only under certain condi-
tions implying that the above two questions can only be
meaningfully answered for specific settings. In case of
the last rule, these conditions single out those settings
for which one can construct an operationally meaningful
joint probability distribution of the F ’s and W ’s records.
II. THE PAGE AND WOOTTERS MECHANISM
We now summarize the Page-Wootters mechanism [9,
12], which begins by considering a clock and system
whose dynamics the clock tracks. The clock and sys-
tem are described respectively by the Hilbert spaces
HC ' L2(R) and HS . The joint state |Ψ〉〉 assigned to
the clock and system is a solution to a Wheeler-DeWitt-
like equation
Hˆ |Ψ〉〉 =
(
HˆC + HˆS
)
|Ψ〉〉 = 0, (1)
where HˆS is the system Hamiltonian and HC = PˆC is
the clock Hamiltonian, which is taken to be the momen-
tum operator PˆC on HC . In general, a Wheeler-DeWitt-
like equation can in some cases be interpreted as arising
from the canonical quantization of a gauge theory with
a Hamiltonian constraint. General relativity is an exam-
ple of such a gauge theory and it is for this reason that
Page and Wootters first put forward their formulation of
quantum theory to address the problem of time [13, 14].
Solutions to Eq. (1) can be obtained by acting on states
in the kinematical Hilbert space K ' HC ⊗HS with the
operator
P ph :=
∫
R
ds e−isHˆ , (2)
that is, supposing |φ〉 ∈ K, then |Ψ〉〉 = P ph |φ〉 is a solu-
tion to Eq. (1). Physical states of the theory, |Ψ〉〉 ∈ H,
are elements of the physical space H, which is not a sub-
space of the kinematical Hilbert space K. This is because
the spectrum of Hˆ is continuous around zero, from which
it follows that physical states are not normalizable in the
kinematical inner product [15, 16]. Thus a new inner
product must be used to normalize the physical states,
which in turn defines the physical Hilbert space H; such
an inner product is defined in Eq. (6) and motivated in
what follows.
First, one defines the time read by the clock as the mea-
surement outcome of a time observable TˆC that is covari-
ant [17, 18] with respect to the clock Hamiltonian HˆC .
3By covariant it is meant that supposing the spectral de-
composition of the time observable on HC is
TˆC =
∫
R
dt t |t〉〈t| , (3)
where |t〉 are eigenkets of TˆC associated with the eigen-
value t ∈ R, the eigenkets are connected to one an-
other by the unitary generated by the clock Hamilto-
nian, |t′〉 = e−iHˆC(t′−t) |t〉. In this case, enforcing the
covariance condition implies that TˆC is canonically con-
jugate to the clock Hamiltonian, [TˆC , HˆC ] = i, and thus
is equivalent to the position operator on HC .
Now consider a system observable Mˆ =
∑
mmΠm,
where {Πm, ∀m ∈ Spec Mˆ} defines a projective valued
measure on HS . The probability that Mˆ takes the value
m when the clock reads time t is given by the Born rule
P
(
Mˆ = m when TˆC = t
)
=
〈〈Ψ | (|t〉〈t| ⊗Πm) |Ψ〉〉
〈〈Ψ | (|t〉〈t| ⊗1S) |Ψ〉〉 .
(4)
In what follows, we will use an abbreviated expression to
refer to these probabilities in which we omit the opera-
tors, i.e., P (Mˆ = m when TˆC = t) ≡ P (m when t).
The form of Eq. (4) suggests defining the conditional
state of the system given the clock reads the time t as
|ψS(t)〉 :=
( 〈t| ⊗ 1S) |Ψ〉〉 . (5)
Further, demanding that the conditional state remains
normalized for all t implies that the physical state |Ψ〉〉
must be normalized with respect to the physical inner
product [19]
〈〈Ψ|Ψ〉〉PW := 〈〈Ψ|
(|t〉〈t| ⊗1S)|Ψ〉〉 = 1, (6)
for all t ∈ R, from which it follows that 〈ψS(t)|ψS(t)〉 = 1.
Given Eqs. (5) and (6), the probability in Eq. (4) may
be expressed as
P (m when t) = 〈ψS(t)|Πm|ψS(t)〉 . (7)
Since Eq. (7) is identical to the probability assigned to the
measurement outcome m given the state of the system is
|ψS(t)〉 by the Born rule in the standard formulation of
quantum theory, we are justified in identifying the con-
ditional state in Eq. (5) as the standard time-dependent
wave function. Further, the covariance condition satis-
fied by the eigenstates of TˆC implies that the conditional
state satisfies the Schro¨dinger equation [12].
We note that because the eigenstates of TˆC can be used
to form a resolution of the identity on the clock Hilbert
space, 1C =
∫
dt |t〉〈t|, physical states may be expressed
as
|Ψ〉〉 =
∫
R
dt |t〉 |ψS(t)〉 . (8)
From the above equation one can immediately see that in
general physical states describe an entangled state of the
FIG. 1. The circuit representation of the Wigners friend
experiment as encoded in the physical state |Ψ〉〉 given in
Eq. (11). As described in the main text, at time tF accord-
ing to clock C the Friend performs a measurement and her
memory gets entangled with the system S. At another time
tW > tF Wigner measures both S and F and his memory gets
entangled with the joint system.
clock and the system. It is the correlations between the
clock and system described by this entangled state that
are responsible for the relative evolution of the system
with respect to the clock.
III. TIMELESS FORMULATION OF THE
WIGNER’S FRIEND EXPERIMENT
We now present a description of the Wigner’s friend
experiment depicted in Fig. 1 in terms of the Page and
Wootters mechanism.
Consider a two-level system (S) associated with the
Hilbert space HS ' C2 and a projective valued mea-
surement of S that yields two possible outcomes, {↑, ↓}.
Such a measurement is described by the set of projectors
{Π↑,Π↓} ⊂ E(HS), where Π↑ + Π↓ = 1S and E(H) de-
notes the space of effect operators on the Hilbert space
H. The Friend (F ) makes such a measurement of S at
the time tF and the outcome is recorded by F ’s mea-
suring device and eventually in her memory, which we
associate with the Hilbert space HF ' C3. Situated out-
side of F ’s laboratory is Wigner (W ), who makes a joint
measurement of S and F with two possible outcomes,
{yes,no}, at a time tW > tF . This measurement corre-
sponds to the set of projectors {Πyes,Πno} ⊂ E(HS⊗HF )
with Πyes + Πno = 1, and its result is recorded in W ’s
memory, the state of which is encoded in the Hilbert
space HW ' C3. The times tF and tW are associated
with a clock system C described by the Hilbert space
4HC ' L2(R) as discussed in Sec. II.
Following Hellmann et al. [20] and Giovannetti et
al. [21], we use a von Neumann measurement model to
describe F ’s and W ’s measurement within the PWM.
The physical states corresponding the Wigner’s friend
experiment in Fig. 1 are solutions to(
HˆC + δ(Tˆ − tF )KˆSF + δ(Tˆ − tW )KˆSFW
)
|Ψ〉〉 = 0,
(9)
where KˆSF and KˆSFW are the interaction Hamiltonians
coupling respectively S and F during F ’s measurement
of S and S, F , and W during W ’s measurement of SF :
e−iKˆSF |ψS〉 |RF 〉 =
∑
f∈{↑,↓}
Πf |ψS〉 |fF 〉 ,
e−iKˆSFW |φSF 〉 |RW 〉 =
∑
w∈{yes, no}
Πw |φSF 〉 |wW 〉 ,
where |ψS〉 is the state of the system for clock read-
ings t < tF and |RF 〉 ∈ HF , |RW 〉 ∈ HW are the pre-
measurement “ready” states of the memories of F andW .
The sets {|RF 〉 , |↑F 〉 , |↓F 〉} and {|RW 〉 , |yesW 〉 , |noW 〉}
form orthonormal bases forHF andHW respectively. Us-
ing this measurement scheme we will calculate the proba-
bilities of result m by projecting onto the memory entries
of the respective observer. Hence, the formula in Eq. (4)
for arbitrary time t becomes
P (m when t) =
〈〈Ψ | (|t〉〈t| ⊗Πm) |Ψ〉〉
〈〈Ψ | (|t〉〈t| ⊗1) |Ψ〉〉 , (10)
where Πm now acts on HM , the Hilbert space of the ap-
paratus or memory storing the result, and |Ψ〉〉 is a solu-
tion to Eq. (9). For simplicity we have assumed no free
dynamics of S, F , and W in Eq. (9) in addition to their
interaction with one another during the measurements.
The solutions take the form
|Ψ〉〉 =
∫ tF
−∞
dt |t〉 |ψS〉 |RF 〉 |RW 〉
+
∫ tW
tF
dt |t〉
∑
f∈{↑,↓}
Πf |ψS〉 |fF 〉 |RW 〉
+
∫ ∞
tW
dt |t〉
∑
f∈{↑, ↓}
w∈{yes, no}
ΠwΠf |ψS〉 |fF 〉 |wW 〉 ,
(11)
for arbitrary states |ψS〉 of the system. When expressed
in the clock basis like in Eq. (11) the physical state en-
codes the complete history of system S and the measure-
ments performed on it. In what follows we will explicitly
consider states
|ψS〉 = a |↑S〉+ beiφS |↓S〉 , (12)
where a, b, φS ∈ R and
|yesSF 〉 = α |↑S〉 |↑F 〉+ βeiφSF |↓S〉 |↓F 〉 , (13)
where α, β, φSF ∈ R, with Πyes = |yes〉〈yes| and Πno =
1 − |yes〉〈yes|, moreover, we will use ∆φ := φS − φSF .
Note that a measurement by Wigner as implied by
Eq. (13) will in general affect the Friend’s memory state
and potentially alter her perceived result.
IV. DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF
CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES, DIFFERENT
SOLUTIONS OF THE WIGNER’S FRIEND
PARADOX
We want to express the dynamical content of a the-
ory in a manifestly operational way, that is, in terms of
probabilities of measurement outcomes. As emphasized
by Kucharˇ [13], the fundamental question in any dynami-
cal theory is: if one measures an observable at the time t1
and obtains outcome a, what is the probability of a dif-
ferent measurement yielding the outcome b at the time
t2 > t1? For non-Wigner’s friend scenarios there have
been two proposals for defining probability rules within
the PWM [21, 22] in order to answer this fundamental
question.Both approaches recover the standard quantum
formalism for the situation of two observables measured
at different times inquired above, however, no consensus
has emerged. Nonetheless, these advances have made it
possible to analyze the Wigner’s friend experiment using
the PWM.
We will be interested in calculating two-time con-
ditional probabilities at times t1 (in between F ’s and
W ’s measurement) and t2 (after W ’s measurement), i.e.,
tF < t1 < tW < t2. Note, however, that the state of
the Friend’s memory is in general modified by Wigner’s
measurement. Hence, it is not any longer possible to sim-
ply read out the information in F ’s memory at the end of
the protocol in order to learn what outcome she originally
obtained and the operational meaning of such two time
conditional probabilities is not straight forward. We pro-
pose three main alternative conditional probability defi-
nitions, two of which are inspired by Refs. [22] and [21]
respectively, as well as a third novel one. While all of
these definitions give the standard quantum probabilities
for non-Wigner’s friend cases (as shown explicitly in Ap-
pendix A), they give different conditional probabilities
for the measurement results of Wigner and his Friend.
While the different definitions naturally fit with differ-
ent interpretations of quantum theory, they are first and
foremost formal proposals for probability rules within the
PWM.
First we propose a conditional-probability rule similar
to that put forward by Dolby [22], where measurement
operators |t1〉〈t1| ⊗Πm together with the operator P ph
(defined in Eq. (2)) are used to calculate two-time con-
ditional probabilities. Specifically, after the application
of one operator |t1〉〈t1| ⊗Πm to the physical state |Ψ〉〉
5the constraint in Eq. (1) is in general no longer fulfilled,
i.e., Hˆ(|t1〉〈t1| ⊗Πm |Ψ〉〉) 6= 0. As proposed in [22] one
uses the operator P ph to obtain again a physical state,
Hˆ
(
P ph|t1〉〈t1| ⊗Πm |Ψ〉〉
)
= 0, before applying a second
measurement operator |t2〉〈t2| ⊗Πn. In order to describe
Wigner’s friend scenarios we account for the measure-
ments as in Eqs. (9)-(11).
Definition 1: (two-time “collapse”). The condi-
tional probability of result n at time t2 given result
m at time t1 is
P1 (n when t2 |m when t1) =
〈〈Ψ | |t1〉〈t1|⊗ΠmP ph|t2〉〈t2| ⊗ΠnP ph |t1〉〈t1|⊗Πm|Ψ〉〉
〈〈Ψ| |t1〉〈t1|⊗Πm|Ψ〉〉 ,
(14)
where Πm and Πn are now the projectors on the
respective states of the apparatus or memories in
HM and HN , and P ph was defined in Eq. (2).
Intuitively, the numerator in Eq. (14), in the fashion
of Ref. [22], is the modulus square of the physical state
|Ψ〉〉 which is first projected on Πm at time t1, then
brought back into the physical space by applying P ph
and finally projected on Πn at time t2. Definition 1
always gives well-defined probabilities, and for the
results of Wigner and his Friend this leads to the
conditional probabilities displayed in Table I. These
probabilities are genuinely two-time, since the expression
explicitly depends on both the times t1 and t2. We
label this definition “two-time collapse” because these
probabilities correspond to applying the state-update
rule (“collapse”) after every measurement. Hence, it
resolves the probabilistic paradox for Wigner’s friend
scenarios insofar as it suggests that both Wigner and
the Friend should describe F ’s measurement with
“collapse” dynamics. Examples of interpretations and
approaches most compatible with this probability rule
are those that purport an objective collapse of the
wave function, see [2, 23]. Note, however, that this rule
does not give rise to a well-defined joint probability
since P1 (n when t2 |m when t1) · P (m when t1) 6=
P1 (m when t1 |n when t2) · P (n when t2). This reflects
the fact that the numerator in Eq. (14) is not invariant
under the exchange of |t1〉〈t1| ⊗Πm and |t2〉〈t2| ⊗Πn.
Alternatively, we consider the conditional probability
rule proposed by Giovanetti et al. [21] in the context of
Wigner’s friend experiments. The authors of [21] include
generalized measurements as described in Eq. (9)-(11) in
the constraint Hamiltonian and apply projection opera-
tors on the measurement apparatus or memories at some
time t after both measurements in question have been
performed, i.e., |t〉〈t| ⊗Πm⊗Πn. This equates measure-
ments at different times with one joint measurement of
the records of the obtained results at a final single time,
which is no longer a trivial thing to do when consider-
ing Wigner’s friend scenarios. The original formulation
P1 (w when t2 |f when t1)
f
w
yes no
↑ α2 β2
↓ β2 α2
P1 (f when t1 |w when t2)
f
w
yes no
↑ α2 β2
↓ β2 α2
TABLE I. The conditional probabilities of Wigner seeing re-
sult w at time t2 given that the Friend saw result f at time t1
and of the Friend seeing f at t1 given that Wigner will see w
at t2 according to definition 1. Note that the two conditional
probabilities are equal and hence, applying Bayes’ rule will in
general not give rise to one joint probability expression.
in [21] states the following rule for calculating conditional
probabilities.
Definition 2a: (two-time unitary, uninterpreted
conditions). The conditional probability (in the
cases where it is well-defined) of result n at time t2
given result m at time t1 is
P2a (n when t2 |m when t1)
=
〈〈Ψ |t2〉 〈t2| ⊗Πn ⊗Πm |Ψ〉〉
〈〈Ψ |t1〉 〈t1| ⊗Πm |Ψ〉〉 . (15)
The intuition behind this definition is to read out both
F ’s and W ’s memories at the final time t2 and take the
modulus square to define a joint probability, and use that
to construct a conditional probability. Namely, to take
the expectation value of the operators Πm and Πn at time
t2 with the physical state |Ψ〉〉 (numerator). This is then
divided by the one-time probability of F finding outcome
m at time t1 (denominator), i.e., before W ’s measure-
ment takes place. Equation (15) depends on both mea-
surement outcomes and on both times t1 and t2, thus
amounting to a two-time probability. However, as shown
in Appendix B, in the Wigner’s friend scenario of Fig. 1,
these expressions are not always proper probabilities, for
they are normalized only if
2α2β2
(
b
a
)2
+ 2 cos(∆φ)(α3β − αβ3) b
a
= 2α2β2
(a
b
)2
− 2 cos(∆φ)(α3β − αβ3)a
b
= 1− α4 − β4. (16)
When these conditions are satisfied, definition 2a gives
the probabilities stated in Table II. While these expres-
sions are formally probabilities, their operational mean-
ing is admittedly not clear to us, except for special cases
(see Sec. V).
6P2a (w when t2 |f when t1)
f
w
yes no
↑ 1+2α2+(β4−α4) cos(2∆φ)±χ
4
1+2β2+(α4−β4) cos(2∆φ)∓χ
4
↓ 1+2β2+(α4−β4) cos(2∆φ)±χ
4
1+2α2+(β4−α4) cos(2∆φ)∓χ
4
with χ := 2 cos(∆φ)
√
1− (α2 − β2)2 sin2(∆φ)
TABLE II. The conditional probabilities of Wigner seeing
result w at time t2 given that the Friend saw result f at
time t1 according to definition 2a. The different signs corre-
spond to the different solutions of the quadratic equations
in Eqs.(16). Note that there is no sensible definition of
P2a (f when t1 |w when t2), since the numerator in Eq.(15)
does not depend on t1 and 〈〈Ψ |t1〉 〈t1|Πw ⊗Πf |Ψ〉〉 = 0.
Considering the general arguments in [20] in favor of
equating measurements at different times with one collec-
tive measurement at a final time, we propose a straight-
forward modification of definition 2a for conditional prob-
abilities.
Definition 2b: (one-time unitary). The conditional
probability of result n given m is
P2b (n when t2 |m when t2)
=
〈〈Ψ |t2〉 〈t2| ⊗Πn ⊗Πm |Ψ〉〉
〈〈Ψ |t2〉 〈t2| ⊗Πm |Ψ〉〉 , (17)
where t2 is some time after the second measurement
has been performed.
These one-time probabilities are always well-defined
and shown in Table III. They correspond to jointly
observable statistics after full unitary evolution (i.e.,
without state-update) and are equivalent to the proposal
in [24]. This resolves the paradox of the ambiguous
probability assignment in Wigner’s friend scenarios
insofar as it corresponds to all observers describing all
measurements unitarily up to the point where they can
all compare their records, that is, the entries in F ’s
and W ’s memories after both measurements took place.
Definitions 2 are natural candidates for probability
rules within both Everettian quantum theory [25] and
Bohmian mechanics [26], because both propose full
unitary evolution of the wave function even during
measurements. Note that for non-Wigner’s friend sce-
narios definitions 2a and 2b are equivalent, since in this
case 〈〈Ψ |t2〉 〈t2| ⊗Πm |Ψ〉〉 = 〈〈Ψ |t1〉 〈t1| ⊗Πm |Ψ〉〉 (see
Appendix A). This is due to the fact that the memory, in
which the result m is stored at some time t1, undergoes
no further evolution until time t2 and after. In contrast
to this, in a Wigner’s friend experiment F ’s memory will
be altered by W ’s measurement and reading it out at
the end will no longer correspond to what was encoded
there immediately after F ’s measurement.
The fact that the Friend’s memory is the only record of
her observed result and is in general affected by Wigner’s
P2b (w when t2 |f when t2)
f
w
yes no
↑
α2
β2
+2 bα
aβ
cos(∆φ)+ b
2
a2
N↑
β2
α2
−2 bβ
aα
cos(∆φ)+ b
2
a2
N↑
↓
β2
α2
+2 aβ
bα
cos(∆φ)+ a
2
b2
N↓
α2
β2
+2 aα
bβ
cos(∆φ)+ a
2
b2
N↓
with N↑ := α
2
β2
+ β
2
α2
+ 2 b
a
cos(∆φ)
(
α
β
− β
α
)
+ 2 b
2
a2
and N↓ := α
2
β2
+ β
2
α2
+ 2a
b
cos(∆φ)
(
β
α
− α
β
)
+ 2a
2
b2
P2b (f when t2 |w when t2)
f
w
yes no
↑ α2 β2
↓ β2 α2
TABLE III. The conditional probabilities for results w of
Wigner and f of the Friend according to definition 2b. The
joint probability is well-defined and corresponds to the nu-
merator in Eq. (17).
measurement raises the question whether it is opera-
tionally meaningful to assign a joint probability to the
results f and w. By construction of the setup these two
results are in general not jointly observable by any single
observer. However, as we shall discuss in the following,
there exist cases in which it is operationally meaningful
to construct a joint probability distribution: One kind
of measurements in which this is possible will be named
non-disturbance measurement. We, thus, propose a third
rule for calculating conditional two-time probabilities,
which agrees with standard quantum theory for non-
Wigner’s friend scenarios and gives well-defined probabil-
ities for Wigner’s friend setups, in the cases where these
probabilities are operationally meaningful.
Definition 3: (two-time unitary, consistency con-
ditions). The conditional probability (in the cases
where it is well-defined) of result n at time t2 given
result m at time t1 is
P3 (n when t2 |m when t1) =
〈〈Ψ|(|t2〉 〈t2| ⊗Πn)P ph(|t1〉 〈t1| ⊗Πm) |Ψ〉〉
〈〈Ψ |t1〉 〈t1| ⊗Πm |Ψ〉〉 . (18)
This rule gives well-defined probabilities (i.e. real and
non-negative) under the condition that the measurement
operators commute on the physical state when compared
at the same instant of time, i.e.[U(t1, t2)ΠmU†(t1, t2),Πn] |Ψ〉〉 = 0, (19)
where U(t2, t1) = 〈t2|P ph |t1〉. However, as Feynman has
argued in Ref. [27], simply because a theoretical frame-
work predicts non-positive probabilities, we may not im-
mediately conclude it is incorrect. Rather it may be the
7P3 (w when t2 |f when t1)
f
w
yes no
↑ 1 (or 0) 0 (or 1)
↓ 1 (or 0) 0 (or 1)
P3 (f when t1 |w when t2)
f
w
yes no
↑ α2 (or 0) 0 (or β2)
↓ β2 (or 0) 0 (or α2)
TABLE IV. The conditional probabilities of Wigner seeing
result w at t2 and the Friend seeing result f at time t1 (above)
and of the Friend seeing f at t1 given that Wigner will see w
at t2 (below), according to definition 3. The probabilities are
well-defined only in the case where Wigner’s measurement is
non-disturbing, i.e. a = α and b = β (or a = β and b = −α).
case that the situations that would lead to the observa-
tion of non-positive probabilities are not physically real-
izable.3 Definition 3 is in line with this reasoning since
it gives proper (i.e. positive) probabilities only for those
settings where they correspond to collectible statistics.
We note that condition (19) ensures that m and n are
part of a family of consistent quantum histories [28] as
shown in Appendix C. According to the consistent histo-
ries framework only within such a family can one mean-
ingfully assign a set of probabilities to the properties
encoded in the respective histories; in the case consid-
ered here, the results of Wigner and his Friend. Hence,
the consistent history interpretation is a natural inter-
pretation of quantum theory for this probability rule,
however other interpretations, such as the Everettian or
the neo-Copenhagen, might also be compatible with it.
Definition 3 singles out the cases of α = 1, β = 0 or
α = 0, β = 1 where the probabilities agree with Table I
and the non-disturbance measurements by Wigner, one
outcome of which corresponds to the entangled state of
the Friend and the system and simply confirms Wigner’s
state assignment (see Appendix D for explicit calcula-
tions). This guarantees that the joint probability distri-
bution between F ’s and W ’s outcomes remain unchanged
3 To quote Feynman directly: “If a physical theory for calculating
probabilities yields a negative probability for a given situation
under certain assumed conditions, we need not conclude the the-
ory is incorrect. Two other possibilities of interpretation exist.
One is that the conditions (for example, initial conditions) may
not be capable of being realized in the physical world. The other
possibility is that the situation for which the probability appears
to be negative is not one that can be verified directly. A combina-
tion of these two, limitation of verifiability and freedom in initial
conditions, may also be a solution to the apparent difficulty.”
from before to after Wigner’s measurement, i.e.
P3 (f when t2 &w when t2) =
P3 (f when t1 &w when t2) , (20)
where the joint probabilities are defined from Eq. (18)
in the standard way, i.e. P3 (n when t2 &m when t1) =
P3 (n when t2 |m when t1)P3 (m when t1). This allows
Wigner and the Friend to exchange their data at a final
time (after tW ) and construct an operational joint (and
conditional) probability distribution that is equivalent to
the one of the measurement outcomes that the Friend
observed at t1 and that Wigner observed at t2. Note,
however, that collecting these statistics is not straight-
forward. For also in the non-disturbance case, the Friend
cannot simply send her observed results to Wigner before
his measurement at tW . Doing so would change the prob-
abilities for Wigner’s measurements (see Ref. [29]). For
the setup depicted in Fig. 1 non-disturbance measure-
ments correspond to
∆φ = npi and
a
α
=
b
β
. (21)
The probabilities given by definition 3 are listed in Ta-
ble IV and coincide with those given by definitions 2a and
2b (i.e., without the application of the state-update). In
contrast to definition 2b, however, definition 3 describes
genuine two-time probabilities, which, contrary to those
given by definition 2a, have a clear interpretation and
operational meaning.
V. DISCUSSION AND OUTLOOK
We have presented three rules to assign probabilities to
consecutive quantum measurements in a Wigner’s friend
scenario using the Page-Wootters mechanism. These
probability rules potentially remove, in different man-
ners, the ambiguity between the application of unitary
dynamics and the state-update rule (“collapse”). While
they contribute to a formal resolution (in fact a few
distinct ones) of the probability-assignment paradox in
Wigner’s friend-like experiments, a number of key issues
remain open: There are potentially more than just the
three probability rules we presented, possibly leading to
other resolutions of the paradox. Is there a way of classi-
fying all of them? Furthermore, what is the operational
meaning of each of the expressions that formally give
probabilities?
Concerning the first question, we ought to stress that
the only necessary condition that we have required from
our definitions of two-time probabilities was that they
have to reduce to the standard Born rule in the non-
Wigner’s friend case, and that they give well-defined
probabilities for at least certain cases of a Wigner’s friend
scenario. However, one can imagine further possible def-
initions that comply with these requirements, hence, a
8FIG. 2. Suggestive graphical representation of the probabili-
ties according to the different definitions in a Wigner’s friend
scenario (when they are well-defined). For non Wigner’s
friend scenarios all the definitions recover standard quantum
probabilities, thus they fully overlap. The two planes distin-
guish between joint probabilities that are in accordance with
applying (collapse) or not applying (unitary) the state-update
rule after the Friend’s measurement. In the non-disturbance
case (i.e., ∆φ = npi and a/α = ±b/β) definition 2a, definition
2b and definition 3 give the same unitary, conditional prob-
abilities, that are different from the collapse ones given by
definition 1. There is, however, at least one instance where
definitions 1, 2a, and 2b coincide (i.e., ∆φ = (n + 1/2)pi,
a = b = 1/
√
2 and arbitrary α).
more systematic study would be desirable. In particu-
lar, one extension of the original proposal of Page and
Wootters put forward by Gambini et al. is to compute
conditional probabilities between averages over ‘evolving
constants of motion’,4 which would be interesting to ex-
amine in Wigner’s friend setups.
To address the second question, we now discuss the
interpretation and the limits of each definition of con-
ditional probabilities presented in the last section (see
Table V for a summary of the definitions and their prop-
erties, and Fig. 2 for a sketched graphical representation).
As already noticed, definition 1 has a clear interpreta-
tion in terms of “objective collapse” probabilities, but
does not give rise to a well-defined joint probability (see
Sect. IV). However, one could maintain that at the oper-
ational level conditional probabilities come prior to joint
4 More precisely, one would construct a family of Dirac observ-
ables, which commute with the constraint in Eq. (1), comprised
of a partial observables associated with a clock and observables
on Wigner’s and his Friend’s memories. Such a family of Dirac
observables is parametrized by the times read by the clock. Con-
ditional probabilities would be computed as in Eq. (4), with the
important difference that the numerator and denominator are
averaged over all readings of the clock. See Ref. [30] for more
detail.
probabilities, which are a posteriori constructions.
On the other hand, definition 2b gives measurement
statistics consistent with standard quantum theory as-
suming S, F and W evolve unitarily and the Born rule is
applied after W ’s measurement interaction has occurred.
While this definition also has a clear interpretation, it
fails in representing genuine two-time probabilities (only
the final time t2 appears in the rule to assign conditional
probabilities for the measurements of F and W ).
Definition 3 has the merit of being interpretable as a
genuine two-time probability, however it is a well-defined
probability (i.e. real and non-negative) only under rather
demanding conditions, that is, when Wigner either mea-
sures what the friend observed or confirms joint state of
the system and the Friend via a non-disturbance mea-
surement (see Table V). In the latter case, the probabili-
ties are the same as definition 2b. The condition required
for definition 3 to result in genuine probabilities can be
interpreted as evidence that only in the non-disturbance
case it is operationally meaningful to construct a joint
probability distribution of the measurement outcomes of
W and F . Indeed, since this joint probability remains
unchanged after Wigner’s measurement (see Eq. (20)),
which allows Wigner and his Friend to collect statistics
after Wigner’s measurement has been performed. Re-
markably, this limitation to the meaningful attribution of
a joint probability of the outcomes of F and W emerges
naturally from our formalism. This suggests a connec-
tion with a recent no-go theorem [5, 7, 31] stating that
it is in general not possible to construct a joint probabil-
ity distribution associated with measurement outcomes
of different observers in a (more complicated) Wigner’s
friend scenario. Moreover, we have shown that the con-
ditions for definition 3 to give well-defined probabilities
ensure that the measurement outcomes of Wigner and
his Friend are elements of a family of consistent quan-
tum histories [28, 32] (see Appendix C).
Finally, definition 2a gives well-defined (i.e., normal-
ized) probabilities only under the conditions in Eq. (16).
Note that the non-disturbance measurement satisfies
these conditions (see Fig. 2), meaning that if Eq. (21)
is satisfied, so is Eq. (16). In general, however, it is not
clear to us how to interpret the probabilities given by
definition 2a operationally. It seems that formally for
any given initial state of the quantum system and fixed
measurement of the Friend, there always exists a mea-
surement choice of Wigner (besides the non-disturbance
one) which ensures that definition 2a gives well-defined
probabilities. However, we do not have an intuition of
what is special about the measurement choices that sat-
isfy Eqs. (16). Moreover, the probabilities provided by
definition 2a (see Table II) do not have a straightforward
interpretation since they do not correspond to either “col-
lapse” or full unitary evolution up to the final measure-
ment of Wigner and unlike for definition 3 we do not find
an operational principle distinguishing them. Again, a
systematic study of all possible probability rules that re-
duce to standard quantum probabilities for non-Wigner’s
9standard QT positive normalized two-time sym. joint Conditions
Def. 1 3 3 3 3 7
Def. 2a 3 3 7 3 3
normalized, if
α4 + β4 + 2 cos(∆φ)(α3β −
αβ3) b
a
+ 2α2β2
(
b
a
)2
= 1
and
α4 + β4 − 2 cos(∆φ)(α3β −
αβ3)a
b
+ 2α2β2
(
a
b
)2
= 1.
Def. 2b 3 3 3 7 3
Def. 3 3 7 3 3 7
positive for α = 1, β = 0 or
α = 0, β = 1 as well as non-
disturbance: a = α, b = β or
a = β, b = −α. And ∆φ =
npi.
TABLE V. Comparison of the different proposed conditional probability rules for describing Wigner’s friend experiments. From
the left to the right, the columns indicate whether each definition: (i) reduces to standard quantum theory for non-Wigner’s
friend scenarios; (ii) is positive; (iii) is normalized; (iv) is a genuine two-time expression; (v) gives rise to a well-defined joint
probability distribution (i.e. P (A)P (B|A) = P (B)P (A|B)). Note, in fact, that definitions 2a and 3 become probabilities
only under certain conditions, the blue 7 indicates that the respective property is satisfied under certain conditions but not in
general. The last column on the right shows these conditions (if any) under which the respective properties are satisfied.
friend scenarios might give further insight. We leave it
up for future work to do so.
Moreover, it will be fruitful to explicitly construct
maps between the perspectives of Wigner and his Friend
using the timeless description of the setup developed here
and the framework of quantum reference frames [33–37].
In contrast to the standard quantum formalism –where
there is a dichotomy between the assignment of prob-
abilities at the moment of measurements and unitary
evolution– the timeless formulation of quantum mechan-
ics places the rule to assign probabilities to measurement
outcomes (Born rule) logically prior to unitary dynamics.
Thus, the timeless formulation is not directly concerned
with the “evolution of quantum states” (in particular the
transition from before to after a measurement), making
it an appropriate tool to deal with the ambiguity of the
standard formalism in describing quantum measurements
in the context of Wigner’s friend experiments.
As long as one considers typical quantum scenarios
(i.e., a system measured one or more times), there have
been at least two different, yet equivalent, proposal in
the timeless formulation of the PWM on how to assign
probabilities to the outcomes of measurements [21, 22].
However, we have shown that to deal with Wigner’s
friend scenarios these two-time probabilities rules ought
to be adapted. We presented two such adaptations and
considered a third proposal, all of which resolve the
ambiguity of the Wigner’s friend probability paradox
in different ways. Thus, in this framework, the ambi-
guity between the two dynamical processes (i.e., uni-
tary evolution versus “collapse”), which characterizes the
quantum measurement problem, is pushed back to the
choice of the probability-assignment rule: Finding com-
pelling physical arguments to rule out all but one of the
proposed two-time probability-assignments would signifi-
cantly contribute to solving the Wigner’s friend paradox.
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Appendix A: Reproducing standard quantum theory
in non-Wigner’s friend setups
For non-Wigner’s friend scenarios the two measure-
ments are performed on the same quantum system in-
stead of one of them measuring both the system and
an observer. The constraint Hamiltonian then takes the
form
Hˆ ′ = Pˆt +HS + δ(Tˆ − tM )KˆSM + δ(Tˆ − tN )KˆSN ,
(A1)
where now M and N are apparatus or memories, in which
the results of the respective measurements are encoded.
This gives the physical state
|Ψ′〉〉 =
∫ tM
−∞
dt |t〉US(t, t0) |ψS(t0)〉 |RM 〉 |RN 〉
+
∫ tN
tM
dt |t〉
∑
m
US(t, tM )Πm |ψS(tM )〉 |mM 〉 |RN 〉
+
∫ ∞
tN
dt |t〉
∑
m,n
[
US(t, tN )ΠnUS(tN , tM )
·Πm |ψS(tM )〉 |mM 〉 |nN 〉
]
,
(A2)
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with both Πm and Πn acting on HS . Moreover, we have
〈t|P ph |t0〉 |φ(t0)〉 = U(t, t0) |φ(t0)〉 (A3)
for arbitrary |φ(t0)〉 ∈ HS ⊗HM ⊗HN , where
U(t, t0) =

US(t, t0) t0 < t
US(t, tM )UMUS(tM , t0) t0 < tM < t
US(t, tN )UNUS(tN , t0) t0 < tN < t[
US(t, tN )UNUS(tN , tM ) t0 < tM < tN < t
·UMUS(tM , t0)
]
,
(A4)
with UM = e
−iKˆSM and UN = e−iKˆSN being the mea-
surement unitaries that entagle the measured system
with the respective memories:
UX |ψS〉 |RX〉 =
∑
x
Πx |ψS〉 |xX〉 ,
and (x,X) ∈ {(m,M), (n,N)}.
According to definition 1 the conditional probability of
result n at time t2 ≥ tN given result m at time t1 ≥ tM
is
〈〈Ψ′ | t1〉Πm 〈t1|P ph|t2〉Πn 〈t2|P ph|t1〉Πm 〈t1|Ψ′〉〉
〈〈Ψ′ | t1〉Πm 〈t1|Ψ′〉〉 ,
(A5)
with Πm and Πn acting on HM and HN respectively.
From Eq. (A2) we see that |φ(t1)〉 := 〈t1|Ψ′〉〉 =∑
m′ US(t1, tM )Πm′ |ψS(tM )〉 |m′M 〉 |RN 〉, and the de-
nominator in Eq.(A5) is
〈φ(t1)|Πm|φ(t1)〉
=
∑
m′,m′′
〈m′′M |Πm|m′M 〉 〈ψS(tM )|Πm′′Πm′ |ψS(tM )〉
= | 〈m|ψS(tM )〉 |2. (A6)
Moreover, since
U(t2, t1)Πm |φ(t1)〉
=
∑
n′
US(t2, tN )Πb′US(tN , tM )Πm |ψS(tM )〉 |mM 〉 |n′N 〉 ,
the numerator in Eq.(A5) gives
〈φ(t1)|ΠmU†(t2, t1)ΠnU(t2, t1)Πm|φ(t1)〉
=
∑
n′,n′′
[
〈n′′N |Πn|n′N 〉 〈ψS(tM )|ΠmUS(tM , tN )Πn′′
· US(tN , tN )Πn′US(tN , tM )Πm |ψS(tM )〉
]
= 〈ψS(tM )|ΠmUS(tM , tN )ΠnUS(tN , tM )Πm|ψS(tM )〉
= | 〈n|US(tN , tM )|m〉 |2| 〈m|ψS(tM )〉 |2 (A7)
and, hence,
P1 (n when t2 |m when t1) = | 〈n|US(tN , tM )|m〉 |2,
(A8)
which are the standard quantum probabilities for two
subsequent measurements on a quantum system S.
In case of non-Wigner’s friend scenarios definition 2a
and definition 2b are equal since
〈〈Ψ′ | t2〉Πm 〈t2|Ψ′〉〉
=
∑
m′,n
m′′,n′
[
〈n′N |nN 〉 〈m′′M |Πm|m′M 〉
· 〈ψS(tM )|Πm′′US(tM , tN )Πn′US(tN , t2)
· US(t2, tN )ΠnUS(tN , tM )Πm′ |ψS(tM )〉
]
= 〈ψS(tM )|ΠmUS(tM , tN )
∑
n
ΠnUS(tN , tM )Πm |ψS(tM )〉
= | 〈m|ψS(tM )〉 |2 = 〈〈Ψ′ | t1〉Πm 〈t1|Ψ′〉〉.
From Eq. (A2) we get that |φ(t2)〉 := 〈t2|Ψ′〉〉 =∑
m′,n′ US(t, tN )Πn′US(tN , tM )Πm′ |ψS(tM )〉 |m′M 〉 |n′N 〉,
and the numerator in both Defs.2 gives
〈〈Ψ′ |t2〉 〈t2| ⊗Πn⊗Πm |Ψ′〉〉 = 〈φ(t2)|Πn⊗Πm|φ(t2)〉
=
∑
m′,n′
m′′,n′′
[
〈n′′N |Πn|n′N 〉 〈m′′M |Πm|m′M 〉
· 〈ψS(tM )|Πm′′US(tM , tN )Πn′′ (A9)
·Πn′US(tN , tM )Πm′ |ψS(tM )〉
]
= | 〈b|US(tN , tM )|m〉 |2| 〈m|ψS(tM )〉 |2 (A10)
Therefore, Defs.2 give the standard quantum probabili-
ties
P2a (n when t2 |m when t1) = | 〈n|US(tN , tM )|m〉 |2
= P2b (n when t2 |m when t2) .
According to definition 3 the conditional probability of
result n at time t2 ≥ tN given result m at time t1 ≥ tM
is
〈〈Ψ′ | t1〉Πm 〈t1|P ph|t2〉Πn 〈t2|Ψ′〉〉
〈〈Ψ′ | t1〉Πm 〈t1|Ψ′〉〉 . (A11)
The denominator is the same as in definition 1 and def-
inition 2a and given by Eq. (A6). The numerator of
Eq. (A11) gives
〈φ(t1)|ΠmU(t1, t2)Πn|φ(t2)〉
=
[
〈RN | 〈mM | 〈ψS(tM )|ΠmUS(tM , tN )U†NUS(tN , t2)
·
∑
m′
US(t2, tN )ΠnUS(tN , tM )Πm′ |ψS(tM )〉 |m′M 〉 |nN 〉
]
=
∑
m′,n′
[
〈n′N |nN 〉 〈mM |m′M 〉 〈ψS(tM )|ΠmUS(tM , tN )Πn′
·ΠnUS(tN , tM )Πm′ |ψS(tM )〉
]
= | 〈n|US(tN , tM )|m〉 |2| 〈m|ψS(tM )〉 |2. (A12)
Hence, also definition 3 gives the standard quantum prob-
abilities for non-Wigner’s friend scenarios.
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〈〈Ψ|t2〉〈t2| ⊗Πw⊗Πf |Ψ〉〉
〈〈Ψ|t1〉〈t1| ⊗Πf |Ψ〉〉
yes no
↑ a2α4+2abα3β cos(∆φ)+b2α2β2
a2
a2β4−2abαβ3 cos(∆φ)+b2α2β2
a2
↓ b2β4+2abαβ3 cos(∆φ)+a2α2β2
b2
b2α4−2abα3β cos(∆φ)+a2α2β2
b2
TABLE VI. Definition 2a evaluated for arbitrary a, b, α, β and
∆φ = φS − φSF . These expressions constitute possible con-
ditional probabilities of Wigner seeing result w ∈ {yes, no} at
time t2 given that the Friend saw result f ∈ {↑, ↓} at time t1
only if conditions (B1) and (B2) are both satisfied.
Appendix B: Conditions for Definition 2a
Evaluating definition 2a for the setup in Fig. 1 gives the
terms listed in Table VI. Normalization requires that ∀f :∑
w
〈〈Ψ|t2〉〈t2| ⊗Πw⊗Πf |Ψ〉〉〉
〈〈Ψ|t1〉〈t1| ⊗Πf |Ψ〉〉 = 1, which gives the following
conditions
α4 + β4 + 2cos(∆φ)(α3β − αβ3) b
a
+ 2α2β2
(
b
a
)2
= 1
(B1)
α4 + β4 − 2cos(∆φ)(α3β − αβ3)a
b
+ 2α2β2
(a
b
)2
= 1.
(B2)
For either α = 0, β = 1 or α = 1, β = 0 Eqs.(B1)
and (B2) are satisfied. Otherwise, the conditions can be
treated as quadratic equations in ba and
a
b , which have
solutions(
b
a
)
±
=
− cos ∆φ(α2 − β2)±
√
1− sin2 ∆φ(α2 − β2)2
2αβ
and
(a
b
)
±
=
cos ∆φ(α2 − β2)±
√
1− sin2 ∆φ(α2 − β2)2
2αβ
,
which exist for any α, β 6= 0 and ∆φ. However, requiring
that
(
b
a
)
± = 1/
(
a
b
)
± has solutions only when combining
either the two “+” or the two “−” solutions. These com-
binations are the common solutions to both Eqs. (B1)
and (B2) and, hence, give normalized probabilities for
definition 2a.
Appendix C: Consistent histories for
Wigner’s-friend setups
In the consistent histories framework sequences of
physical properties are assigned to a closed quantum sys-
tem. These sequences are represented by tensor products
of orthogonal projectors (i.e. a quantum history)
Y i = ρ0 ⊗ P i11 · · · ⊗ P iff , (C1)
where ρ0 is the initial state and each P
ik
k corresponds to
some physical property at a certain time k. A consis-
tent family of histories is a complete set of histories {Y i}
which satisfy the consistency condition
tr
(
K†(Y i)ρ0K(Y i
′
)
)
= 0 for i 6= i′ (C2)
where i = (i1 . . . if) and K is the so called chain operator
defined by
K(Y i) = P i10 · P i20 · · · · P if0 , (C3)
with P ik0 = U(t0, tk)P
ik
k U(tk, t0). Only within a consis-
tent family the dynamics of quantum theory describe the
respective properties over time.
For the simple Wigner’s-friend setup in
Fig. 1, these properties are the results ob-
served by Wigner and his Friend, i = (f,w) and
ρ0 = |RW 〉 |RF 〉 |ψS〉〈ψS | 〈RF | 〈RW |. Condition (19)
–under which definition 3 gives proper probabilities–
implies that
tr
(
K†(Y (f,w))ρ0K(Y (f
′,w′))
)
= δff ′δww′ tr
(
ρ(t2)Π
wU(t2, t1)Π
fU(t1, t2)
)
, (C4)
where ρ(t2) = U(t2, t0)ρ0U(t0, t2). Hence, in this case,
the consistency condition is satisfied.
The solutions to the conditions on definition 2a, how-
ever, in general do not satisfy Eq. (C2). Consider the
concrete counterexample of |ψS〉 =
√
1
2 (|↑〉 + |↓〉) and
|yes〉 = α |↑, ↑〉+ iβ |↓, ↓〉. In this case one obtains
tr
(
K†(Y i)ρ0K(Y i
′
)
)
= ±δww′ i
2
αβ for f 6= f ′, (C5)
which still satisfies the so called weak consistency con-
dition Re
[
tr
(
K†(Yi)ρ0K(Yi
′
)
)]
= 0. In contrast to the
consistency condition of (C2), however, this has been
shown to be highly problematic concerning trivial com-
bination of independent subsystems as well as dynamical
stability, see Ref. [38].
Appendix D: Non-disturbance and Conditions for
Definition 3
Evaluating definition 3 for the setup in Fig. 1 gives the
terms listed in Table VII. Those expressions are in gen-
eral not probabilities, since they are neither necessarily
real nor positive although they do add up to one. For
them to be real numbers we require that
∆φ = npi. (D1)
For α = 0, β = 1 or α = 1, β = 0 all the terms in Ta-
ble VII are positive. For α, β 6= 0 the terms are positive
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〈〈Ψ(|t2〉〈t2|⊗Πw)Pph(|t1〉〈t1|⊗Πf )|Ψ〉〉
〈〈Ψ|t1〉〈t1|⊗Πf |Ψ〉〉〉
yes no
↑ α2 + b
a
αβe−i(∆φ) β2 − b
a
αβe−i(∆φ)
↓ β2 + a
b
αβe−i(∆φ) α2 − a
b
αβe−i(∆φ)
〈〈Ψ(|t2〉〈t2|⊗Πw)Pph(|t1〉〈t1|⊗Πf )|Ψ〉〉
〈〈Ψ|t2〉〈t2|⊗Πw|Ψ〉〉
yes no
↑ aα
aα+bβe−i(∆φ)
bβ
bβ+aαei(∆φ)
↓ a2β2−abαβei(∆φ)
a2β2+b2α2−2abαβ cos(∆φ)
b2α2−abαβe−i(∆φ)
a2β2+b2α2−2abαβ cos(∆φ)
TABLE VII. Definition 3 evaluated for arbitrary a, b, α, β
and ∆φ possibly constituting the conditional probabilities of
Wigner seeing result w ∈ {yes, no} at time t2 given that the
Friend saw result f ∈ {↑, ↓} at time t1 and that of the Friend
seeing f at t1 given that Wigner will see w at t2. These ex-
pressions are real and positive and, hence, probabilities only
if conditions (D3) and either (D6) or (D7) are satisfied.
if one each of the following conditions hold. If either
α2 − a
b
αβ ≥ 0 and β2 − b
a
αβ ≥ 0 (D2)
or
α2 − b
a
αβ ≥ 0 and β2 − a
b
αβ ≥ 0, (D3)
the conditional probabilities for result w at t2 given result
f at t1 are well-defined. And if, either
1− bα
aβ
≥ 0 and 1− aβ
bα
≥ 0 (D4)
or
1− bβ
aα
≥ 0 and 1− aα
bβ
≥ 0, (D5)
the conditional probabilities for result f at t1 given result
w at t2 are well-defined. The solutions to both cases are
a = α , b = β (D6)
or
a = β , b = −α, (D7)
which means Wigner’s measurement is aligned with the
initial state. The joint system of F and S is in an
eigenstate of W ’s observable, i.e., the measurement is
non disturbing. Note that for the settings above the
probabilities P3(w when t2 | f when t1) coincide with
P2b(w when t2 | f when t2). Since we also find that
P3 (f when t2 &w when t2) (D8)
= 〈〈Ψ′ | t2〉Πf 〈t2|P ph|t2〉Πw 〈t2|Ψ′〉〉
= 〈〈Ψ′ | t2〉Πf ⊗Πw 〈t2|Ψ′〉〉
= P2b(w when t2 | f when t2),
we get that
P3 (f when t2 &w when t2) =
P3 (f when t1 &w when t2) , (D9)
which means the two-time probabilities given by defini-
tion 3 correspond to collectible statistics after Wigner’s
measurement.
